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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PERRY MESSICK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 16605 
PHD TRUCKING SERVICE, EJC. , 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPmTDENTS 
STAT:t:l1ENT OF l'HE '.!ATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action for an accounting between a truck 
driver-operator and a trucking service to determine whether 
monies were due and owing or whether a settlement had been 
effected. 
DISPOSI'.LIO~J rn TliE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried on April 19, 1979, before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of the District Court of Utah County. The 
court found that the parties had reached an accord and satisfaction 
on October 22, 1976, and entered judgI!lent against the plaintiff-
appellant, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT m~ APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent prays the court to affirm the findings 
and judgment of the trial court. 
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STATUn:::l'I' OF FACTS 
From January, 1973, to December, 1973, plaintiff-
appellant was an employee truck driver of PHD Trucking Service, 
Inc. R. 122, 8-10. Toward the end of 1973, plaintiff approac', 
Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt, the owners and principal officers 
of PHD Trucking, and asked if he could buy a truck from them. 
R. 122, 19-3J; R. 123 1-14. 
On December 7, 1973, plaintiff entered into a buy-sell 
agreement with Verl Davies and Ray Hiatt, owners and principal 
officers of PHD Trucking, for the purchase of a 1963 Kenmore 
Tractor. Plaintiff paid $2,000.00 dovm and gave a note forthe 
balance of $8, 000. 00 to Davies and Hiatt. It was further agreec 
that the revenue from the truck operation would be handled throu; 
PHD Trucking Service and that the cost of fuel, license plates, 
property tax, highway use tax, repair parts and insurance 
premiums \Jere to be deducted from the proceeds earned by the 
operation of the truck. Also charged as an advance to the I 
operation of the truck was $175.00 per week to plaintiff. Plaid 
agreed to lease a durlp trailer from Davies and Hiatt to use on 
the job, at the rate of 5 cents per r:iile, and also to provid~ 
certain insurance on the trailer Ex. 9. 
Shortly after that. in January, 1974, nlaintiff lli11:' 
I 
agreed that, rather t!Hn receive the Sl75.00 per week, he would I 
instead be paid for whatever he earned for driving the truck 
R. 143, 5-27. 
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All hauling done by the plaintiff for the defendant, 
PHD L'rucking, was performed on a per job tonnage basis. R. 186, 
10-13; R. 190, 16-21; R. 193, 20-30; R. 194, 16-23; R. 208, 20-29; 
R. 212, 24-30, 213, 1-22 (See also Ex. 26, 27). 
Plaintiff kept Exhibits 26 and 27 as his only daily 
record of the trips which he made in the truck. R. 132, 19-26. 
By his own records, which were introduced at trial, plaintiff 
only kept track of the invoice nunber, the point of origin and 
the weight of each load which he carried as he oµerated the truck. 
Ex. 26, 27. From these daily records, the plaintiff turned in 
his invoices to PED Trucking Service, Inc., for credit to his 
account. R. 150, 8-20. In fact, all of the driver-operators 
working through PHD Trucking Service were paid on a tonnage hauled 
basis . R . 1 6 9 , 18 - 3 0 , 1 7 0 , 1. 
So that plaintiff could continue to operate the truck, 
the parties signed a lease form dated January 1, 1974, (Ex. 3), 
for the purpose of meeting the Public Service CoOITJissions authority 
requireraents. R. 95, 24-30, 96, 1-4; R. 167, 16-30, 168, 1-9; 
R. 186, 6-9; R. 193, 19,20; R. 223, 8-21; R. 224, 19-30, 225, 1. 
The lease form signed on Januc"ry 1, 1974, was for a 
period from January 1, 1974, to July 1, 1974. However, during 
this time the plaintiff continued to operate the truck on a 
per trip tonnage basis, and continued to do so for the entire time 
that he was an owner-operator of the truck. Ex. 3, 26, 27. 
On or before ~ovember 22, 1974, plaintiff was pulled 
over at the Price Port of Entry and cited becau~e the first lease 
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form had expireu. ':his precipitated a neH lease fon~ to 
give plaintiff authority to operate under PHD Trucking Services 
Certificate of Authority. Exhibit 4 R. 125, 11-30, 126, 1-4 
In May of 1975, the plaintiff ceased hauling fort~ 
defendant and leased his truck out to other companies, and had 
the income from the truck paid directly to him instead of PHD 
Trucking, in contravention of the buy-sell agreement. Ex. 9. 
The reason the plaintiff gave for this action was that he belie·:; 
that he had paid for the truck under the terms of the buy-sell 
agreement. R. 126, 8-12. 
Throughout this period and into the Fall of 1976, 
the defendant made nlli:lerous requests that plaintiff account to 
them for the expenses incurred by plaintiff in operating the 
truck. The defendant gave plaintiff Exhibits 5 and 6 in the 
Spring of 1976, again requesting that he verify his expenses. 
R. 220, 221. 
An accounting of plaintiff's payments on the truck, 
the money he had been paid for operating the truck, and his 
obligation to defendant under the buy-sell agreement was given 
to plaintiff in early October, 1976. R. 123. After receiving 
the accounting, the plaintiff offered to return the truck to 
Davies and Hiatt, asking for a settlement of $2,500.00. On 
7 h 1 · f - d a counter-offer settle-I October 22, 19 6, t e p ainti t accepte 
in the amount of $2,000.00 minus $473.97 for a fuel bill charge: 
by plaintiff to defendant, and reconveyed all of his interest 
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in the truck. R. 130; Ex. 7. 
Plaintiff continued working for defendant for some time 
after the settlement was reached. R. 184, 11-15. In July, 1977, 
nine months after the settlement was reached, and several months 
after plaintiff ~uitdriving for defendant, this lawsuit was 
brought in an attempt to raise again the issues of the accounting 
between plaintiff and defendant, which had been settled by the 
parties in October, 1976. R. 2. 
Having received evidence and having heard the testimony 
of the witnesses and considered their credibility during the 
trial of this matter, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen found that 
the dealings between the parties had been settled in the settlement 
agreement on t:1e accounting in 1976, and entered judgment 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action. R. 47. 
Plaintiff's Motion for a new trial was denied (R. 69) 
and his appeal ensued. 
A R G U fl E N T 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FEIDINGS OF FACTS SHOULD BE 
ACCEPTED UllLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintiff asserts in his brief that this court, ·~ust 
conduct an independent evaluation of the evidence in the record." 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 12. However, a careful analysis 
of the scope of review in equity cases by this court reveals that 
it can nodify the trial court's findings or make new findings only 
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if the record compels it. First Security Bank of Utah vs. 
Demiris, 10 Utah 2d 405, 354 P2d 97 (1960). 
The general rule on the scope of review of the find~~ 
of a trial court in equity is clearly set forth by the court ~ 
the following cases: 
In an equity case in which the Supreme Court reviews 
the Findings of Fact of the trial court, it over 
turns them only where it is manifest that the trial 
court has misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearl a a inst the wei ht of evidence. ~etro~olitan 
Investment Co. vs. Sine, Utah u , 376 P2 940, 
(Emphasis added). 
In equity cases the Supreme Court reviews the evidence 
keeping in mind that the trial court heard and saw 
the witnesses, and reverses if the court concludes 
the the evidence clearly nreponderates against the 
decision. Barker vs. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 342 
P2d 867, (Emphasis added). 
Although the question of a boundary line by 
acquiescence is a matter of equity, the Supreme Court 
will reverse the trial court's Findings of Fact~ 
if it concludes that they are clearly erroneous. 
!lunley vs. lfalker, 13 Utah 2d 105, 369 P2d 117, 
(Eophasis added). 
The above cases set forth the requirment that before 
this court can reverse the Findings of Fact of the trial comt 
in an equity case, this court must first find the trial court's 
Findings of Fact to be "clearingly against the weight of 
evidence" or "clearly erroneous." 
Although there was considerable conflict in the testi· 
monies of plaintiff and defendant from which the trial court ~a: 
to decide in order to make its Findings of Fact, this court 
should keep in mind that the trial court heard and saw the w1···' 
and could first hand observe their demeanor, candidness, or 
lack thereof. This is in keeping 11ith. the rule stated in 
• 
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Stone vs. Stone, 19 IJtah 2d 378, 431 P2d 802, in which the court 
stated t'.l.a t, "Even thoui:;h the Constitution states that in equity 
cases the court may review the facts, the court will nevertheless 
take into account the advantaged position of the trial judge." 
A review of the entire record of this case adequately 
supports the trial court's Findings of Fact that the parties 
came to a settlement agreement as to the amount of monies due 
and owing to plaintiff for operating the truck and monies due 
and owing the defendant under the purchase agreement on the truck. 
Although there was conflicting testimony as to these material 
facts, the record is entirely adequate to support the trial 
court's conclusion that the parties reached an accord and satis-
faction in October, 1976. The decision of the trial court was 
neither "clearly erroneous" or "clearly against the weight of the 
evidence," and this court should affirm the Findings of Fact of 
the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE FACTS AS SET FORTH IN THE RECORD AMPLY SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DEC IS ION. 
While there were many conflicting factual allegations 
made by the plaintiff and defendant, some of the facts were 
undisputed by the parties. Both plaintiff and defendant agreed 
that all monies earned by the operation of the truck would be 
paid to PHD Trucking Service. Certain expenses were to be deducted 
for the costs of operation, and included in the deductions 
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would be all payments made to the plaintiff for operating the 
truck, and the difference was to be credited or debited to 
the plaintiff for the purchase of the truck. Both parties 
also agreed that an accounting was offered by the defendant to 
the plaintiff in October, 1976, including the monies credited 
to the truck for its operation, the expenses of operating the 
truck, including payr.ients made to plaintiff as driver, and the 
balance due and owing on the truck under the terms of the buy-
sell agreement. The dispute arises as to whether the settlement 
which was reached in October of 1976 was a settlement of the i 
accounting given to the plaintiff by defendant, or whether the 
I 
plaintiff was merely selling the truck back. 
It is clear fror.1 the record that the accounting on 
the operation of the truck was a dispute. In this disagreer:ient, I 
I defendant claimed $8,971.02 still owing on the truck after 
crediting plaintiff with net earnings from the operation of t~ 
truck. Ex. 2. Plaintiff claimed that he had earned enough to 
pay for the truck. R. 126, 7-12. 
The disagreenent >ms really over whether plaintiff o•,:< 
defendant on the truck as per Exhibit "Q' or whether the truck 
was paid for and defendant owed ?laintiff. Realizing that t~e 
truck was the central object of the accounting, the trial cour'. 
upon examining Exhibit 7 and the testimony of the witnesses, 
. ,.J 
made a findings of fact that the parties had entered into a se .. 
and agreement on October 22, 1976. 
As stated by the Suprene Court of the State of Kai:s' 
• 
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"an accord and satisfaction is the adjustment of a disagreement 
as to what is due from one party to another and the payment of 
the agreed amount." Manning vs. Woods, Inc., 182 Kan. 640, 
324 P2d 136. 
Therefore, it was just and proper for the trial court 
to conclude that the parties had an accord and satisfaction, whereby 
the truck ,,,as returned to defendant and a settleraent of $1,526.03 
was paid to plaintiff. 
POINT III 
PAROL EVIDEllCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THAT THE 
PARTIES DID imT DlTEND THE PP-OVISI0!1S OF THE 
LEASE FORl'IS TO BE VALID. 
Plaintiff asserts that the court erred in admitting 
parol evidence to modify the terms of the lease forms used by 
the parties to confer operating authority on plaintiff. However, 
a careful review of the record reveals no instance where defendant 
sought to nodify the terms of the lease forms. Defendant asserted 
that it was not intended or understood by either party that 
the lease forms be binding as such. 
"Evidence is admissible, at least in equity, to 
show that a writing which apparently constituted 
a contract was not intended or understood by 
either party to be binding as such. The oral 
testimony in such a case does not vary the terms 
of the writing but shous that it was never intended 
to be a contract or to be a binding force between 
the parties. 
"'.Lhe parol evidence rule presupposes an action based 
on an existing valid contract, and if the issue 
is as to the validity or legality of the contract, 
the rule, by its very terms, has no applicat~on, 
and extrinsic evidence is admitted to determine that 
issue, whether such evidence tends to establish the 
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validit~ or invalidity of the contract in question 
Such evidence does not vary or contradict the 
writing, but serves to establish that it has no 
force or efficacy." 30 Am Jur 2d 1034, 35. 
There was clear and convincing evidence that the 
leases were only used to r.ieet public service commissiori author:: 
requirements. R. 95, 24-30, 96, 1-4; R. 167, 16-30, 168, 1-9. 
R. 186, 6-9; R. 193, 19, 20; R. 223, 3-21; R. 224, 19-30, 225,, 
And that the only reason the second lease form was prepared was' 
because plaintiff has been cited for driving without public serj 
commission authority. R. 125, 11-30, 125, 1-4. 
CO:lCLUSION 
The record in this case is entirely adequate to supnc: 
the trial court's findings of fact that the parties came to a 
settlement agreement concerning the truck and its operation. 
The court did not error in permitting parol evidence as to the 
intention of the parties concerninb the lease forms. ,-he ora~ 
testimony in this case was not to vary the terns of the lease. 
but showed that the leases were never intended to be a contracc · 
or to be a binding force between tl-ie parties. The findings 
of the trial court were not clearly against the weight of 
evidence nor clearly erroneous, and this court should affir~ 
the findings of fact of the trial court. Havin13 found a settle-~ 
agreement obtained the parties in October, 1976, with oayoent 
h Jefd to the plaintiff of a disputed sur.i and reconveyance to t e 
of the truck, the court's conclusion that the parties have 3.: 
accord and satisfaction is supported by its findin:=;s of fac~; 
the record in this case. 
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For the above reasons, defendant respectfully submits 
that the findings and judgment of the trial court should be 
affimed. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 1979. 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
!JAILED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents 
to Jackson Howard, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, 
postage prepaid, this 4 day 
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